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fullness of detail worthy of Helmholtz in the *Optik*. Criticism of the subject matter, if criticism is to be made, would be an occasion for siege operations and not for a skirmish ; and it is hardly worth while here to point out such small and hypothetical betterments as may have occurred to the reviewer. The author's expositions are everywhere clear, his arrangement good, and he has succeeded, in the reviewer's belief, in the by-no-means-small feat of making the quasi-mathematical portions of the work simple enough for the non-mathematical student.

Criticism from the pedagogical point of view is, perhaps, another matter, in particular with reference to the appropriateness of such a course for undergraduate students. And here the reviewer is inclined to dissent. Even if students be required, as is very likely the author's intention, to perform certain selected experiments and not the whole list, the question remains whether the time of an undergraduate cannot be better spent than in such intensive cultivation of so narrow a field. A half-year's laboratory work is a good part of a student's undergraduate course, and psychophysics, however important, is but a small part of a small part of psychology as a whole. With a graduate student, in training for a career as an experimentalist, the case would be in many respects different, though here again objections of other sorts suggest themselves.

The ideal laboratory course for undergraduates is something that we are drawing near to by approximations. Professor Titchener has brought us much nearer to it than we have ever been before, but has, perhaps, a trifle overshot the mark. This, however, is a slight matter in comparison with the importance of his present contribution to experimental psychology in general.

EDMUND C. SANFORD.

CLARK UNIVERSITY.

*L'idéalisme contemporain.* Par LÉON BRUNSCHVICG. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1905.— pp. 185.

This volume is made up of a series of articles which have already appeared in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, with an additional chapter which gives the title to the book and forms the natural conclusion of the various discussions. In the first chapter on "Spiritualisme et sens commun," the author purposes to show how common sense, which has always been in bondage to words, may free itself and exchange its materialistic form of spiritualism for a form which is truly spiritualistic. "De quelques préjugés contre la philosophie" is an

attack on the philosophy of feeling and will. "De la méthode dans la philosophie de l'esprit" is a reply to criticisms directed by M. Cante-cour against the author's interpretation of idealism in his *Introduction à la vie de l'esprit*; and "La philosophie nouvelle et l'intellectualisme" is an attack on M. LeRoy's 'new philosophy' or 'new positivism,' which is really a form of pragmatism; and the subject for discussion in this last essay is essentially the same as that in the second chapter.

The reader who is unfamiliar with the controversies in the French philosophical journals would have much difficulty in following the argument in this book, were it not for a preface in which the author gives a clear statement of his main theses. His first thesis is that philosophy has ceased to be metaphysics and has become criticism. His Kantianism, however, does not go so far as to include the second critique: he is anti-voluntaristic throughout. Contemporary idealism is, then, in no sense a system of metaphysics. Idealism, and with it spiritualism and intellectualism, are, in his view, simply methods or constitutive forms of science. They do not pretend to go beyond science; they have no dealings with a transcendent.

The realism which rests on simple affirmation is no longer possible; a legitimate realism, the rational affirmation of the existence of the external world, — which M. Brunschvicg somehow or other seems to admit as possible, — presupposes criticism, that is to say, idealism. For this idealism is no more subjective idealism than it is absolutism; it is simply a method. And bound up with it is a spiritualism which, as already noted, is non-metaphysical, which professes to stay within the sphere of science, to be, indeed, a necessary part of science. For science contains something more than facts; it posits the law of matter, and by that very act shows that it cannot be subject to the law of matter, that it must be a reality distinct from matter. The element which matter does not supply is mind, spirit. This is related to matter, which is a mass divisible into parts each external to all the rest, as is the thought to the words of the phrase which express it. It is not an absolute; it is a living activity, a productive power, the capacity for producing ideas, something free, autonomous, never completed and never fixed. Individuality itself is not something stable and permanent; it is simply the starting-point for inner development. The problems which arise in connection with its activity are not to be solved if we conceive of truth, goodness, and God, as things possessing an absolute existence. Truth is that which is verified, virtue is progress of inner being; instead of an absolute God this new spiritualism finds an inner ideal principle which is constantly mani-

fested in us. This is the interpretation of idealism, which M. Brunschvicg recommends to common sense, and, until common sense shall have adopted it, he regards the complete rationalization of the human race as impossible.

It may be said in criticism of this view of spiritualism, that its advocate by no means convinces us that he has eliminated the Absolute. The Absolute which appeared as something fixed and transcendent has been publicly banished, but it is not so certain that an Absolute has not reappeared in this self-activity of unlimited possibilities. The author does not profess to banish 'being' altogether, there is spiritual reality, but it consists in a spontaneously active thought, and can, therefore, never be mere object of thought. He denies that this being is an Absolute, but, even granting that, it is by no means clear that matter, which is an object of scientific research, is not itself transcendent. For he denies that the explicative principle is at the same time a constitutive principle. Matter, apparently, is not mind, nor is it the product of mind. M. Brunschvicg certainly fails to avoid metaphysical implications, in spite of his preliminary denial of metaphysics.

To return to the author's development of his position. We find spiritualism further defined as intellectualism. This, again, is not metaphysical; it simply means that all reality can be explained according to rational principles; Harvey's theory of circulation, for example, was intellectualistic. Intellectualism is equally opposed to abstract formalism and to positivism. Herein it agrees with the 'new philosophy' advocated by M. Le Roy and others. But it does not agree with the positive part of that theory. M. Le Roy holds that thought alone can offer no solution. A system of ideas may be perfectly clear and consistent, and yet be false. The final appeal, he maintains, is to life itself, to the will; the final test is to be found in practice; action is the positive reality; it is in intuition that truth is given. M. Brunschvicg believes that this leads to scepticism and contradiction, and that M. Le Roy is no better than a materialist.

But, before taking up the points made in the controversy, it will be well to note first the author's treatment of the subject in the less polemical chapters. The problem is raised in the first chapter, where we are told that the philosophy of feeling and will do not really exist; for 'reasons of the heart' and 'principles of the will' are still reasons and principles. They involve ideas and the faculty of comprehension, and hence, intellection. In the next chapter the philosophies of feeling and will, — which 'respond to the desires of the crowd' and have

been very influential, — are examined more closely. Spinoza affirmed that “ ‘ the modes of thought,’ as love, desire, or any other affection of the soul, are given only when there is present in the mind of the individual, the idea of the thing which is loved, desired, etc. But the idea may be given without any other mode of thought.” He believed this to be an axiom. M. Brunschvicg denies that there are axioms, yet holds that Spinoza’s statement is correct and can be sustained. He examines first the view that feeling and will can determine themselves immediately without the intervention of ideas, and finds that in the historical examples of the philosophies of feeling and will there is always involved determination, analysis and justification, hence ideas, etc. But it may be maintained that although intellection is present, it is subordinate to feeling and will ; that it has a value, but a theoretical value only, while true value is practical. M. Brunschvicg reminds us that intellectualism does not desire to exclude feeling and will ; they are, of course, present in the moral life, but moral life begins where the *end* of action is marked, where the value of the idea or feeling is judged. Feeling, it is true, goes beyond reason, but it is only confused consciousness ; the difference between it and intellection is only a matter of degree. There is really no conflict of faculties, for there are no faculties. Thought is a function of the organism, and feeling and will are two of its movements. Man should philosophize with his whole mind, and all the aspects of thought should be involved. There can be, he repeats, no philosophy of feeling and will. Rational philosophy *is* philosophy.

A large part of the difference between M. Brunschvicg and those whom he opposes is due to the difference in the way in which they understand such terms as ‘thought’ and ‘mind.’ M. Brunschvicg wishes to include in them feeling and will, while the others use them in a narrower sense. It is all thought, says our author, and then he adds: “but clear thought is the ultimate court of appeal.” Here, there is a real difference of principle, and it can best be discussed in connection with the controversy contained in the chapter on “La philosophie nouvelle et l’intellectualisme.” Here we may take as a starting point M. Le Roy’s division of action into *l’action pratique, l’action discursive, et l’action profond*, analogous to Plato’s three stages of knowing ; the first gives common sense ; the second rules science ; the third is the criterion of philosophy. In the second, discursive action, we have intellectual activity which is analytic and leaves discontinuity in our knowledge. M. Brunschvicg objects that intellection is synthetic as well as analytic ; that it is the only possible ground of “profound

action," the condition in which we "live matter." He maintains that this kind of action, which is really æsthetic intuition, is quite unintelligible apart from clear thinking. Continuity, the only continuity which is of value as knowledge, is to be found by way of intellection. A feeling of identity with the object is not the real solution of discontinuity in knowledge. Intellectualism finds the test of judgments not in any such experience, but in their fitness (for knowledge) and their universality. He opposes the principle of immediate experience; as for the pragmatist formula, he prefers Spinoza's statement: *Mens nihil aliud utile esse judicat nisi id quod ad intelligendum conducit.*

In conclusion, it seems to the reviewer that, tested by the principles of intellectualism which the author professes, he has not triumphed over his opponents, and that his idealism has not finally disposed of metaphysics.

ADAM LEROY JONES.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

*L'âme et le corps.* Par ALFRED BINET. Paris, Flammarion, 1905. — pp. 288.

This is a discussion of the psychophysical problem in rather sketchy and popular form, and dominated by the pleasant spirit of Montaigne; the issue is admitted at the outset to be a transcendental one upon which no man can speak with authority, yet about which everybody likes to speculate by applying empirical principles with care-free deftness. The first assumption to be made in a discussion of the relation of mind to body is that "we know only our sensations about the external world" (p. 10); "sensation is the intermediary placed between the object and our cognitive faculty" (p. 13). But in Binet's thinking this is not an idealistic assumption, but rather a realistic one; he takes it to mean that sensations are the only objective things we know. "The objects of the real world are, for us, only sensation-aggregates" (p. 51), but "the term object has two meanings, now that of sensation qualities and then again that of the cause of these qualities" (p. 17); and we know that there exist objects apart from our nervous system, because we do perceive the sensed objects in one place and the nervous system in another (*ibid.*). The writer does not seem to realize, however, that he is presupposing the transcendent reality of space in all these remarks; for he fails throughout to distinguish between spatial distribution and transmental existence. It is one thing to say that we experience truly the noumenon *X*, which is the objective cause of our sensations of it, in a given position which is not identical with the position of the nou-